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TEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION*
By WILLIAM P. CANTWELL
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in 1942 and his LL.B from Yale Law
School in 1948. He was in practice
in New York until 1953 when he
moved to Colorado. He is active
in the American, Colorado, and
Denver Bar Associations and is a
member of the Denver firm of Hol-
land and Hart.
Even though the Revenue Act of 19481 first used the term and
enacted the concept into law, the true history of the "marital de-
duction" started in 1942. Before that year residents of community
property states enjoyed a very substantial advantage under federal
tax laws. In an effort to correct the situation Congress deprived
these people of their advantage in the field of estate and gift taxa-
tion by its 1942 legislation 2 although no change was made in the
income tax situation. It soon became apparent that a worthwhile
differential still existed in the income tax field, and that the con-
tinuation of the income tax advantage for residents of community
property states made it sufficiently attractive so that states which
had been common law property states were willing to change to a
community property system for the sole purpose of obtaining the
benefit of split income treatment on federal income taxation., As
a result of an extensive study, the Revenue Act of 1948 altered the
situation and extended the benefits of split income treatment to
residents of all states of the United States. At the same time, it
enacted into law a dramatic new concept of estate and gift taxa-
tion which has since become the single most important weapon in
the estate planner's arsenal. This was the "marital deduction." The
amendments were heralded as the adoption of a new national sys-
tem for ascertaining federal estate and gift tax liability 4 and at
least one court has taken the clear intent of Congress to have been
the equalization of estate tax results between community property
;states and common law states.'
* This article is based on ar address given at the 8th Annual University of Denver Tax Institute.
1 lt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e), added by 62 Stat. 117 (1948) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,§ 2056).2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811, as amended, 56 Stat. 941 (1942).
S Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 51, 53 Stat. 27 (1939). Under community property law, one-half of
the earnings of either spouse is attributed to the other and must be taxed as such. Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101 (1930).
4 H.R. Rep. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
5 Newton v. Wiseman, P-H Est. & Gift Tax Serv. 140,811 (W.D. Okla., July 22, 1958).
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Thus the original vista was the complete equalization of the
tax consequences of deaths and gifts in common law and commun-
ity property states. The extent to which this vista has been realized
has followed the typical pattern of practically every tax benefit con-
ferred by legislatures. This particular tax benefit has become a true
workhorse in the field of estate planning and to this extent the
vista of the 1948 legislation has been and is being realized, day in
and day out, throughout the country. To the extent that it has
failed of realization, these failures are due to the taxpayer's per-
ennial enemies of ingenuity on the part of revenue agents on the
one hand and careless, incompetent or unsophisticated draftsman-
ship and advice on the other.
It is noteworthy that there has been no legislative erosion, and
indeed, only legislative liberalization. In the Revenue Act of 19546
Congress took its first liberalizing steps and extended marital de-
duction benefits to situations in which a surviving spouse was ac-
corded appropriate rights over a fractional share of trust principal,7
thus abandoning the original requirement that a marital deduction
trust must be a separate trust in which no one else could have an
interest, in order to qualify." In addition, it permitted a marital
deduction for a legal life estate coupled with a general power of
appointment.9 Case law has indicated 10 that this power of appoint-
ment must be one over the remainder, rather than a mere lifetime
power of consumption. The second legislative liberalization occur-
red in 1958, when Congress made the liberalizing features of the
1954 legislation retroactive to April 1, 1948.11
Aside from legislative developments, however, the deduction
has been one more arena of conflict in the great unending match
of ingenuity between the Internal Revenue Service and the tax-
payer. The areas in which this conflict has developed represent the
true developments in the past ten years of experience with the
deduction, and the remaining inquiry spotlights a few of these areas
from the point of view of the literature, the case law, and the actual
experiences of banks and trust companies working in the field.
A. PROBLEMS INVOLVING FORMULA CLAUSES
The first and most persistent problem area has concerned for-
mula clauses. Whatever it is that a formula clause really is, there
are at least several things that it is not. For example, concern with
a formula clause and its use is not the same thing as concern with
whether a testator should plan his estate to take a maximum mari-
tal deduction. This question is really a prior question and no formu-
fa-clause question arises until someone decides, on the basis of ap-
propriate analysis of a particular estate, that the last penny of mari-
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e)(1)(F), added by 62 Stat. 118 (1948).
9 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(5); Treas. Reg. I 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
10 Estate of McGehee, 28 T.C. 412 (1957).
11 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 18 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6634 (1958), amending
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e)(1)(F), 62 Stat. 118 (1948). These changes apply to estates of de-
cedents dying after April 1, 1948, and before August 17, 1954. Refunds without interest are authorized




tal deduction is significant.12 This is a question which is ignored all
too frequently, for it is easy to overlook the fact that substantial dif-
ferences in tax brackets between the two spouses must exist before
it is imperative to obtain every last penny of marital deduction."
Neither is the formula clause question one of an outright disposition
as opposed to a trust disposition. A marital deduction gift, whether
formula or determined by other means, may be either outright or
in trust, although care must always be taken that the trust be quali-
fied for the deduction.
The formula clause is actually an ingenious development of
tax oriented practictioners, intended to achieve a qualification of
just that quantum of the decedent's adjusted gross estate which is
needed to obtain the maximum marital deduction and no more,
even though the exact amount will fluctuate right down to the
audit of the federal estate tax return because of changing values,
composition, transfers and other factors composing the gross estate.
14
One feature that no formula clause can correct is an "overqualifica-
tion" of assets. For example, if a testator gives his wife his entire
estate outright, he probably has "overqualified" assets passing to
his spouse by rendering the entire estate passing to her subject to
taxation at her death. The fact that a formula clause in and of itself
cannot correct this defect is a source of some criticism by those who
have indicated opposition to the use of such clauses.
Indeed, critics of the formula clause have developed a formid-
able case against its use."5 Some of the points they score are the
possibility of unconsciously passing all of the benefit of appreciation
of assets during administration to someone other than the surviving
spouse; frustration of intent when a formula clause operates in a
situation involving many non-probate assets which were not thought
to have been includible in the gross estate, such as gifts in contem-
plation of death, retained life interests, and the like; the possibility
of future changes in the law; the.fact that the actual amount of the
12 Durand, Draffmanship: Wills and Trusts, Proceedings, Probate and Trust Law Divisions of the
A.B.A. 70, 72 (1957).
13 Regarding the tax on various sized taxable estates (before deducting the $60,000 exemption),
only a 5% jump in brackets occurs between an estate of $160,000 and one of $810,000, and only a
7% jump occurs between $160,000 and $1,060,000. (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2001). An estate of
$100,000 is actually in a 4.8% bracket since the first $60,000 is exempt and the next $40,000 is sub-
ject to a tax of $4800.
14 Bronston, Tax Problems of Formula Type of Marital Deduction Bequest, Proceedings, Probate
and Trust Law Divisions of the A.B.A. 96 (1957); Cox, Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses,
N.Y.U. 15th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 909 (1957).
15 Trachtman, Estate Planning 35-41 (1958).
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gift being given by the testator is uncertain; and the possibility of
conflicts of interest between the surviving spouse and the fiduciary
and the residuary beneficiaries. In this latter area, for example, it
has been suggested that a surviving spouse might wish to argue
for a higher valuation of the gross estate since it would mean a
larger gift under a formula clause. It has also been suggested that,
for the same reason, she may argue to include certain inter vivos
transfers which might otherwise be excludible. It has also been
suggested that she may wish to argue for the use of administration
expenses in a way which would produce a greater overall tax bur-
den to the estate, but a larger marital deduction gift for her.16 One
interesting feature of all of these suggested conflicting interests is
that they assume that the surviving spouse and relatives of a dece-
dent who confers a marital deduction gift by the use of a formula
clause will fight among themselves. While this may be the unfor-
tunate fact in some cases, most draftsmen seem to take a more cheer-
ful outlook on such matters, and the facts seem to sustain them. The
revealing result of a survey of financial institutions' experience
with the deduction, discussed later in this paper, discloses no con-
flicts of interest in these areas in the administration of nearly two
thousand estates involving the marital deduction.









Without intending to deprecate the articulate and persuasive
arguments that have been made against the use of formula clauses,
it seems fair to suggest that the profession generally has not been
persuaded.1 7 The literature abounds with discussions of formula
clauses and very little of the current discussion is concerned with
the question of whether or not they should be used.' Rather, the
question has become: Which formula clause should be used - a
"'pecuniary formula," or a "fraction-of-the-residue" formula.
Historically the "pecuniary formula" was the earliest develop-
ment in the field.19 Its developers and early advocates preferred it
because it avoided a difficult problem of computing estate taxes in
a situation in which two mutually dependent indeterminants were
involved, 0 and in addition the idea prevailed that a marital deduc-
tion trust had to be completely separate and therefore created by
a separate article in the will, ahead of the residue. Unfortunately,
disadvantages soon appeared. Usually the pecuniary formula clause
had the effect of setting aside a pecuniary legacy, fixed in amount,
and not subject to fluctuation. As a result of this, if such a dollar
amount legacy was satisfied by distribution of assets which had
appreciated in value, a capital gain would be realized by the estate."
The second disadvantage was that any appreciation of assets
during the period of administration would not usually pass in satis-
faction of a pecuniary formula clause, but would instead pass to
residue. Obviously, the significance of this last disadvantage would
vary from case to case, depending upon who the beneficiaries might
be and how the property has been left among them. Certainly if
the wife herself is an income-tenant of a residuary trust which
would not again be subject to taxation at her death, it would be
preferable to avoid appreciation of the marital deduction share and
to permit appreciation to go to the residuary trust. On the other
hand, in a situation in which a marital deduction gift was one to a
second wife while the residuary, beneficiaries were children of a
first marriage, some antagonism might be anticipated. Under these
circumstances, difficulties might very well be avoided if the widow
and the children shared equally in appreciation, rather than having
substantially all of it go to one set of such beneficiaries. And finally,
appreciation may be desirable and even usual, but depreciation of
assets during administration has been an occasional-if unfortunate
-fact, and in addition, some estates will consist largely of debt-type
investment which will vary little in value during administration.
Concern about these disadvantages of the pecuniary type for-
mula clause resulted in the development of what has come to be
71 Durand, supra note 12, at 70.
18 E.g., Bowe, Estate Planning and Taxation 99-103 (student ed. 1957); Casner, Estate Planning
640-51 (2d ed. 1956); Shattuck and Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook § 52 (2d ed. 1953); Bronston,
supra note 14; Cox, supra note 14; Golden, A Decade with the Marital Deduction, 97 Trusts and Estates
304, 305 (1958).
19 Golden, supra note 18, at 304-05.
20 Ibid.
21 Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), off'd, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 573 (1936); Rev. Rul. 270, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 325.
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called a "fraction-of-the-residue" clause. 22 This is a clause specifi-
cally developed to answer the problems discovered in applying
pecuniary clauses. Since a fraction-of-the-residue clause merely
measures out a fractional participation in whatever is left after all
other dispositive provisions of the will are satisfied, it participates in
appreciation (and in depreciation as well!). In addition, satisfac-
tion of this clause will not result in any capital gain to the estate,
since no specific dollar amount is being satisfied with appreciated
assets.
Some of the other advantages which have been recited in favor
of a fraction-of-the-residue formula gift include solution of the
problem of allocation of income received during administration.
Since a trust gift which is intended to procure the maximum deduc-
tion will ordinarily require that the wife receive all the income
from and after death 2 anything which will insure that the trust
participates in its pro-rata share of income without the necessity
for complicated calculations of such income will be beneficial. In
addition the fraction-of-the-residue clause has been described as
easier to understand than the pecuniary formula clause. Testators
have traditionally dealt in terms of fractional shares of the residue,
but they have only come to formula-type phraseology since the
Revenue Act of 1948 and seem generally slower to grasp it than
they do the concept of a fractional share of the residue.
The use of a fractional share of the residue clause will not nec-
essarily solve the problem of the interrelationship between the
amount of the deduction and the death taxes, unless the will directs
that taxes are to be paid out of assets other than the surviving
spouse's share.24 While computations to solve such an interrelated
problem are admittedly difficult and complex, they are certainly
not insoluble, and if substantial other benefits come from the use of
such a clause, the deterring effect of such tax calculations should
not rule the determination of which type of clause to use, even
though a testator may want his surviving spouse to bear her ap-
portionable share of death taxes.25
The fact of the matter is that both types of clauses can be ex-
ceptionally useful. If a draftsman is confronted with a situation
in which it would not be good estate planning for a spouse to obtain
the benefits of appreciation of assets, a pecuniary formula may very
well be the solution of the problem. Such a situation would defi-
nitely exist, for example, where there were no children and the
surviving spouse obtained the income benefits from a trust as to
the second half of the estate as well as the income from the marital
deduction portion. Since the taxes on the second half of the estate
would have been paid at the death of the first spouse, and since the
second half would not again be subject to taxation, then apprecia-
22 Loveil, Administering the Marital Deduction-A Summary of Five Years' Experience, 92 Trusts
& Estates 812 (1953).
23 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(8), (9) (1958); Special Ruling 9-20-57, 2 CCH Est. & Gift Tax Rep.
8127, 1958 P-H Fed. Tax Serv. 140,456 stated that the marital deduction would not be lost
because of a provision in the will that income received during administration (including income
from property passing to the surviving spouse) should be used for expenses of administration, but
that the marital deduction would be reduced by the amount of income so expended.
24 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(c) (1958).




tion would be desirable in such second half, while it would be
equally desirable to keep the marital deduction trust invested in
assets which were not expected to appreciate, and to first charge any
necessary principal distributions against such trust. Under these
circumstances, a good case would exist for the use of a pecuniary
type formula which would tend to limit the use of appreciated
assets to satisfy the marital deduction gift.
In addition, it is submitted that the capital gains problem which
would ordinarily exist in satisfying a pecuniary formula gift with
appreciated assets can in itself be solved by careful attention to the
wording of the controlling instrument. Just how significant such
wording can be is demonstrated by a recent series of cases which
discuss in detail the question of whether or not a particular form
of phraseology requires or permits satisfaction with appreciated
assets.2 6 The problem that arose in these cases is similar to prob-
lems that will probably continue to arise in marital deduction cases
which use language relating to certain standards of "value" to be
followed, without indicating whether such standards of value refer
,only to determination of the dollar-value of a pecuniary formula
gift, or whether they also refer to the value-standard to be used in
making distributions to satisfy that gift. The general rule is that
distributions from estates are to be valued at the date of distribu-
tion. Questions raised by pecuniary formula clauses demonstrate
that draftsmen have not always made it clear whether they intend-
ed to change this rule for distribution purposes, or whether the
language they used about value-standards applied only to the quan-
tum of the gift, and otherwise left the general rule in force as to
distributions.
In the Kantner case 27 for example, the language in the pecun-
iary formula clause stated that "all values shall be those finally de-
termined for federal estate tax purposes." At issue in the case was
the meaning and application of this phrase. The executor contended
that the phrase meant that the stock which was to be distributed
in satisfaction of the pecuniary gift should be valued for distribution
purposes at the value actually set in the federal estate tax return,
regardless of an increase in value on the actual date of distribution.
A guardian ad litem for minor children resisted this application,
and contended that the shares should be valued for distribution
purposes at the higher market value they had on the actual date
of distribution. An acceptance of this position would decrease the
number of shares required to be distributed in satisfaction of the
pecuniary gift and thereby penalize the surviving spouse. It would
correspondingly increase the amount going to the trust for the min-
ors. The court agreed with the guardian's position, and required
that the shares be valued, for purposes of distribution, at date of dis-
tribution value, and held that the language in the pecuniary form-
ula clause did not relate to distribution values but only to values
used to determine the quantum of the pecuniary amount.
26 Estate of Kantner, 50 N.J. Super. 582, 143 A.2d 243 (App. Div. 1958); In re Bush's Will, 2
App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 167 N.E.2d 927 (1957); Estate of Jeph-
son, 1956 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. City, Nov. 13, 1956).
27 Estate of Kantner, supra note 26.
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In Jephson 2 the analogous language was: "All values shall be
determined as of the date of my death." Here the court held that
the testator wished to avoid capital gains tax and therefore that the
shares should be valued at the date of death value for distribution
purposes, even though they had appreciated at the actual date of
distribution. Consequently, a more substantial number of shares
would pass in satisfaction of the pecuniary formula gift than would
have been the case had the Jephson court followed the same rea-
soning as the Kantner court. In the third case, In re Bush's Will,",
the language required distribution of the securities "at the ap-
praised values thereof" and the court found an intent similar to
that in the Jephson case.
The type of problem that can arise in this area can be illustrat-
ed by an example. It can be assumed that a testator uses a pecuni-
ary formula, and that the formula requires a marital deduction gift
with a dollar value of $100,000. Assume also that at the date of'
death there are 100 shares of the X corporation worth $100,000 and
100 shares of the Y corporation also worth $100,000. At the date of
distribution, the 100 shares of X have increased in value to $150,000
and the 100 shares of Y have decreased in value to $50,000. Adop-
tion of different value concepts may alter completely the share dis--
tributed in satisfaction of the $100,000 pecuniary gift from $50,000
28 Estate of Jephson, 1956 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. City, Nov. 13, 1956).
29 In re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 167
N.E.2d 927 (1957). The court applied date of death values in measuring the value of securities to.
be distributed, these values having been selected by the executor for estate tax appraisal pur-
poses. The court further required that the executor distribute appreciated securities in such a way-
that the widow and the residuary legatees share in these securities proportionately.
Today's biggest bargain in complete research! Complete answers
to your everyday problems for only 30 cents-that's the average cost
of an annotation in any current volume of ALR2d. The annotation
gives the controlling law and facts and holdings of all cases on
both sides of the question, including all your local cases.
Ask about low terms now in effect on ALR2d "50 Series."
BANCROFT-WHITNEY CO. BENDER-MOSS CO.
McAllister & Hyde Streets 91 M cA I li s t er Street
San Francisco 1, California San Francisco 2, California
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to $150,000-a very considerable swing. If, for example, it could be
argued that the valuation language in the will permitted the execu-
tor to distribute at date of death values, he could distribute either
the $50,000 of Y, in which event the widow would actually get some-
thing which was worth $50,000 less than the amount required by
her pecuniary formula at the time of receipt, or she could get $150,-
000 worth of X, which would in effect allocate appreciation in sat-
isfaction of the pecuniary formula. Some commentators have been
considerably concerned about the use of clauses which would permit
such possibilities, particularly with reference to the possibility of
the distribution of assets with a value, at the distribution date, be-
low the amount called for in the formula.30 They have suggested, as
a matter of caution, that it would be well to include a proviso, if
date of death values are actually being used for distribution pur-
poses, which would require the executor to distribute property
which was worth, on the date of distribution, at least as much as the
dollar value required by the pecuniary formula. To do otherwise,
they suggest, would be to endanger the marital deduction."
In summary, the area of the marital deduction formula clause
is a potential problem area, much as any other area of complex
drafting is. Many problems could be avoided by diligent analysis
of the particular problems and desires of a testator and by meticu-
lous use of language which specifically covers the known problem
areas. To do less is to invite serious and irremediable difficulty.
VARIANTS FOR OBTAINING A MARITAL DEDUCTION OF THE "RIGHT"
AMOUNT.
Adequate planning may often require that something less than
a maximum marital deduction should be taken. Draftsmen have
been concerned with this problem, since it is certainly not solved
by a formula clause alone. Some of the ideas developed can be used
either with or without formula clauses for obtaining or attempting
to obtain maximum tax benefits in this area. For example, one au-
thor has suggested the possibility of setting forth multiple gifts in
the will. 32 Under such a plan, a testator could offer his surviving
spouse a choice of fifteen per cent of his estate outright, thirty per
cent of his estate in trust with a right to draw on the principal, or
fifty per cent in trust with a testamentary power of appointment.
3 3
The multiple gift idea has been one of fairly recent development
and therefore has not yet attracted widespread attention. However,
it may have particular usefulness in situations in which the value
of the estate is so volatile that precise pre-death planning is diffi-
cult. Whether it is preferable to a formula clause will depend upon
the apprehension of the draftsman as to the problems inherent in
the use of the formula clause, and on other factors such as the in-
cludibility of inter vivos transfers. Certainly if the multiple gift
idea is used, it should be coupled with a provision which would re-
quire that the executor distribute something absolutely to the sur-
viving spouse if no choice has been made within six months after
30 Casner, op. cit. supra note 18, at 648-51; Cox, supro note 14, at 930-32.
31 Ibid.




death. For if a spouse is required to make a choice and fails to do
so within the six-month period, 34 it would appear that it might be
very difficult to protect the estate's right to any marital deduction,
unless she was sure to get something even if she made no choice.
One other post-mortem possibility which has occasioned atten-
tion is the use of partial disclaimers to whittle down the amount
qualified for the marital deduction in a situation in which post-
mortem conditions make this desirable.3 5 The new federal gift tax
regulations appear to throw draftsmen back to conditions of their
state law to determine whether or not a partial disclaimer may in-
volve a taxable gift,36 which is a considerable advance over the ten-
tative regulations, which were very affirmative in indicating that
such a partial disclaimer would in fact be taxable as a gift.37 Cer-
tainly if local law permits a disclaimer 38 and if the conditions of lo-
cal law are such that a partial disclaimer would not result in a tax-
able gift, it is quite evident that this may be a particularly useful
tool in situations where the exact composition of the estate of a sur-
viving spouse as well as the taxable estate of a deceased spouse can
only be realistically appraised after the death of the first of them.
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND GIFTS IN TRUST
Within the first ten years of experience with the marital deduc-
tion, a considerable amount of litigation has been developed with
respect to trusts. Basically, two types of trusts are possible under
the regulations. The most widely used is the power of appointment
trust, under which the surviving spouse is given all income for life,
payable annually or more frequently, with a power of appointment
over the corpus in favor of herself or her estate, exercisable by her
alone and in all events, and with no power of appointment over the
trust in any other person.3 9  The second type of trust is the "estate
trust"4 0 which is a trust which is coupled with a vested remainder
in the surviving spouse's estate. The estate trust has been recom-
mended as useful in situations where there are non-income produc-
ing assets, since it is felt that it will qualify under such circum-
stances, while qualification of a power of appointment trust would
be open to question, since it requires that the widow receive all of
34 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3 (1958).
33 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-i (1958); Cosner, op. cit. supra note 18, at 659-61.







37 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(.) (1957).
38 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-5-44 (Supp. 1957). "Disclaimer. Any person who may be entitled to
receive any property . . . under a devise, bequest . . . shall have the right to disclaim irrevocably
the whole or any part of such property . . . . Any property . . . so disclaimed shall pass . . .
as if the person disclaiming had predeceased such decedent .. ."
39Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(o) (1958) sets forth the requirements for a power of appoint-
ment trust as follows:
(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all of the income from the entire interest
or a specific portion of the entire interest, or to a specific portion of all the income from the entire
interest.
(2) The income payable to the surviving spouse must be payable annually or at more fre-
quent intervals.
(3) The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint the entire interest or the specific
portion to either herself or her estate.
(4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by her alone and (whether exer-
cisable by will or during life) must be exercisable in al events.
(5) The entire interest or the specific portion must not be subject to a power in any other
person to appoint any part to any person other than the surviving spouse.
40 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(b) (1958); Bowe, op. cit. supro note 18, at 92-93; Cosner, Estate
*Planning under the Revenue Act of 1948-The Regulations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1949).
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the income for life,41 and further requires her to have power to
cause the assets to be made income producing.
The main area of dispute with respect to power of appointment
trusts concerns the actual power of appointment given to the spouse.
Here there have been a number of cases, and they appear to turn
largely on provisions of state law regarding the scope of a power
conferred.42 For drafting purposes, the most significant item to re-
member regarding a power of appointment is the specific language
of the regulations 4 which provide that the surviving spouse must
have a power of appointment "exercisable in favor of herself or her
estate and exercisable alone and in all events." Attempting to cavil
with these requirements by restricting a power of appointment has
been the most important factor which has given rise to litigation in
the field of marital deduction trusts.
4 4
In addition to problems with respect to the powers of appoint-
ment, the creation of marital deduction trusts involves certain other
drafting problems. For example, a wife may die between income
periods. In such a situation, a draftsman will be safe in being silent
about the use of income collected during the last period and never
paid to the wife while living, if he is certain as to the status of his
"local law. '45 On the other hand, if he cannot firmly convince him-
self as to what the local law may be on the disposition of such in-
come, it is a simple matter for him to insert a phrase in the will
subjecting this income to the wife's power of appointment.
Another area which requires penetrating analysis of the assets
of an estate at the planning stage is that in which a marital deduc-
tion formula gift is made in trust, with no recognition of the fact
that many non-probate assets may make this a very small, or in-
deed, a dry trust. Such a disposition would be inefficient, and could
be avoided in most cases where it might be present by simply pro-
viding for an outright gift if the gift did not meet a certain dollar
limit, with a trust transfer if it did exceed such a limit.
Use of a power of appointment trust raises certain questions
with respect to taxation in the surviving spouse's estate and also
with respect to the exercise of the power of appointment. In many
41 Casner, supra note 40, at 101.
42 Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958) ("power of invasion in widow
. . . she to be the sole judge .... " Held: Not equivalent to o fee simple and not qualified as
r wer of appointment trust.); Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957) (Widow
ad power "to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and principal . . . in her uncontrolled
discretion." Held: Under New York low, this is not equivalent to a fee simple interest and is not
qualified for the marital deduction.); Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955) (Power
to invade corpus would be lost in event of widow's legal incapacity or upon appointment of
guardian. Held: Power not exercisable in all events.); Dexter v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 442
(D. Mass. 1958) (Testator "authorized and empowered" trustee to make payments for benefit of
widow. Held: Trustee could refuse to make a payment requested by the widow and trust does
not qualify.); Matteson v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.N.Y. 1956) (Will gave widow a
power to invade corpus if trust income was insufficient, of which the widow would be the sole
judge. Held: Disqualified for the marital deduction because insufficiency of income was a condi-
tion to exercise of the power to invade.); Estate of Allen, 29 T.C. No. 52 (1957) (Testamentary
power "to appoint as the widow sees fit" did not qualify as a power of appointment trust be-
cause of Maryland decisions limiting a testamentary power to a special power of appointment.).
43 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1958).
44 Cases cited note 42 supra.
45 Treos. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(8) provides that it is sufficient if trust income not distributed
to the wife is accumulated and subject to the wife's power of appointment.
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states, a residuary clause will automatically exercise a power of ap-
pointment, unless there is an affirmative showing of intent to avoid
exercise of the power. Under these circumstances, the assets of a
power of appointment trust could be subjected to an additional set
of administration expenses, even though they might pass under the
residuary clause of the surviving spouse's will to the same persons
who would be the takers in default if the power was not exercised.
In addition, since the assets of a power of appointment trust will be
includible in the estate of the surviving spouse if she does not dis-
pose of them during life, it is incumbent upon the draftsman to
ascertain whether or not death taxes attributable to such assets can
be paid from other assets of such surviving spouse, or whether some
provision for apportionment of taxes to the corpus of the power of
appointment trust should be included in the surviving spouse's will.
To overlook this could wipe out the surviving spouse's probate
estate which might unduly penalize beneficiaries preferred by that
spouse over takers in default under the first decedent's will, or
might, if brought to the attention of the surviving spouse, result in
an exercise of the power of appointment which might not be other-
wise desirable because of state death tax consequences or otherwise.
GENERAL MARITAL DEDUCTION DRAFTING PROBLEMS
There is a series of general drafting problems raised by the use
of a marital deduction, whether the gift passes outright or in trust.
One of these involves the allocation of the burden of taxes, and re-
quires a new analysis of how the burden should be allocated. This
is because any taxes which are payable out of the marital deduction
share will reduce that share and correspondingly raise the taxes."6
An entirely different set of results will 6btain in a situation in
which taxes are apportioned to the marital deduction share from
one in which they are not. For example, in a $300,000 estate, if the
wife takes a $150,000 marital deduction, and if the taxes are paid out
of the other half, then the federal estate tax is $17,500. If they are
payable out of both halves equally, then the tax is $20,163.17. Con-
sequently, it is incumbent upon the draftsman to review such prob-
lems with the testator and to ascertain which of these two results
seems preferable to him. No stock answer will apply in all situa-
tions, since testators will have varying ideas as to whom they wish
to favor.
46 U.S. Treas. Pub. 210, supro note 25; Cosner, op. cit. supra note 18, at 651-55.
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Another problem which has arisen in a number of cases is the
tax result of an election by the surviving spouse. There is a wide-
spread conflict among the various states here, 7 and every drafts-
man must canvass his own situation to determine what the effect of
an election would be. While an attempt might be made to regulate
the burden of taxes in the event of an election, it would certainly
be a courageous individual who would predict the success of such
an attempt. Consequently, the best thing that can be done is to sim-
ply make the testator aware of the possible tax consequences of an
election and to suggest to him that his liquidity problems and other
administrative and dispositive desires will depend on such a con-
tingency.
The requirement in a power of appointment trust that the wife
receive all of the income from and after the testator's death has
caused most draftsmen to use phraseology which would make this
possible. However, should there be any affirmative indications in
an instrument that this result was not desired during the period of
administration then it would appear that the deduction proper
would not necessarily be lost, but that it would be reduced .4
Another area of concern is that of the distribution of nonquali-
fying assets to satisfy a marital deduction gift. If there are non-
qualifying assets in a testator's estate, section 2056 of the 1954 code
provides that if they may be used to satisfy the marital deduction
gift, they will reduce it by a pro-rata share which is deemed to pass
to the marital deduction gift by an application of a "marital deduc-
tion conduit theory," in the absence of language preventing the sat-
isfaction of the gift with nonqualifying assets. Consequently, wheth-
er the distribution is to be outright or in trust, good draftsmanship
would appear to require phraseology which would affirmatively
prevent the satisfaction of the marital share with assets which are
not qualified for the marital deduction.
Considerable discussion has arisen regarding survivorship and
simultaneous death clauses, and there has been litigation in the
field as well.4 9 In this area, the draftsman and planner must first
decide whether or not he is interested in the marital deduction in
any event, or whether he only wants the deduction if the surviving
spouse should survive for a considerable period. In approaching
this question, an analysis must be made of both estates. Even
though both estates may have substantial assets, if there is a wide
gap in ages, or if the spouses are young, there is certainly a better
statistical possibility that the surviving spouse would survive for
some considerable length of time and therefore that the yield on
the estate tax money saved by the use of the marital deduction
would be a significant factor over the period of survivorship. In
these situations, it would appear to be desirable to spin out the sur-
47 Estate of Jaeger, 27 T.C. 863 (1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1958). Under local low, taxes
attributable to property passing to the surviving spouse are apportioned to her share of the
estate. Contra, Street v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1957); Estate of Babcock v. Commis-
sioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956); Hamrick v. Pitts, 135 F. Supp. 835 (W.D.S.C.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 486
(4th Cir. 1955). Under local law, the share of the estate passing to the surviving spouse should bear
no portion of federal estate tax.
48 See note 23 supra.
49 Smith v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 344 (D. Colo. 1957); Estate of Steele v. United States,
146 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mont. 1956); California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1956);
Kellar v. Kasper, 138 F. Supp. 738 (D.S.D. 1956).
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vivorship requirement to the maximum period of six months by use
of a "time clause."5 Since yield on tax money saved is the basic
thing at stake, the longer the postponement the more likely the
long-range survival which would make the yield a significant fac-
tor. In other situations, in which the marital deduction is desired
regardless of the time of survivorship, since an overall tax saving
would be made in both estates so long as the substantial estate own-
er is the first decedent, then the only sensible clause is a "survivor-
ship clause" which injects a presumption that the spouse with the
small estate survives, in the absence of proof to the contrary21
With respect to the administration expenses involved in the
use of survivorship clauses which would pass estates through two
administrations, it is often asserted that a double dose of admini-
stration expenses will be payable if a survivorship clause is used.
This is not necessarily true in the case of a power of appointment
trust, since its assets would not enter the probate estate of the
spouse with the power of appointment, unless such spouse exercised
it in favor of his or her estate. Consequently, a second set of ex-
penses on such a trust as a part of the surviving spouse's probate
estate would not be present.
A SURVEY OF ACTUAL ExPF RicE-1948-1958
In. the interest of obtaining a sampling of experience with the
actual administration of the marital deduction, a survey was taken
in connection with the preparation of this discussion. The survey
was based upon an analogous survey which was conducted after
five years of experience With the deduction in 1953.52 Similar ques-
tions were asked, although the present survey was limited in its
geographic ambit to banks and trust companies in the western
part of the United States, with particular emphasis on the Rocky
Mountain states.
The following description of the questions asked and the re-
sponses, with certain notes from the institutions responding, re-
ports this survey. The questionnaire was sent to twenty-six banks
and trust companies. They were first asked how many estates in-
volving the marital deduction they had administered. The total
sampling involved in their responses was 1956 estates. They were
50 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056-b(3) (1958).
51 Bowe, Draftsmanship: Wills and Trusts, Proceedings, Probate and Trust Law Divisions of the
A.B.A. 25-28 (1955).
%2 Lovel, supra note 22.
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next asked how many estate tax audits had been completed, and it
developed that only 361 of the 1956 estates, or 18.35 per cent, were
still open.
In an effort to determine how many difficulties existed in these
estates as a result of the use of the marital deduction, the banks
were asked to describe what difficulties they had had. They report-
ed difficulties in only thirty-three estates, or 1.7 per cent of all of
the estates, as a. result of the use of the marital deduction. One of
the institutions responding to this question pointed out, as an ex-
ample of the kind of difficulties encountered, that in a particular
case an agent had gone into questions such as the production of in-
come, payment of dividends on closely held family stock, long term
leases, and the administration of the trust. Another bank respond-
ed as follows:
"Since I have been with the Bank, the Federal Field
Agents have not gone beyond their traditional interests in
assets and deductions and have not been concerned with
the way the estate has been administered and what has
been used to satisfy the marital share. I recall one case dur-
ing my years with the Internal Revenue Service wherein
they were interested in what was used to satisfy the mari-
tal share. I do not recall the exact facts, but they are sub-
stantially as follows: H and W had entered into an ante-
nuptial agreement; by his Will H left his entire estate to the
children of his prior marriage. About the only asset re-
maining in H's estate after the payment of his debts, ex-
penses, and taxes, was stock in X Corporation, a closely-
held corporation which was valued at $300,000-the adjust-
ed gross estate; W filed her election to take against H's
Will; the children of H filed their objection to W's election
and relied on the antenuptial agreement; finally, W sold her
one-half interest in X Company stock to H's children for
$75,000 and simultaneously H's children withdrew their ob-
jections to W's election to take against the Will. The mari-
tal deduction was limited to $75,000 (the amount which W
received upon the sale of her interest in the stock of X
Company) instead of one-half of the adjusted gross estate
($150,000). I am informed that the local office often re-
quires assurance as to what assets comprise the marital de-
duction trusts where individuals are acting as sole trus-
tees. However, we have had no such difficulty."
Still a third reported:
"I can only recall one estate in which the marital de-
duction, as such, occasioned the federal audit's difficulties.
This arose in a situation where trusts were set up long be-
fore the marital deduction was ever heard of and the wid-
ow had power to draw down the proceeds of the sale of the
assets of one-half of the trust. The problem was the indi-
visibility of the trust, and, as you know, the technical
amendments act of 1958 may make it possible for us to
claim a refund on this score, in view of the fact that there
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is one year in which to file claims for refund where the
trusts were not divided by the specific provisions of the in-
struments concerned."
Another one pointed out that:
"Our local Federal Estate Tax Examiner is inclined to
go beyond the checking of assets and deductions where
marital deduction is involved in some instances. Several
years ago in the matter of the estate which was not han-
dled by our trust department he had the income tax de-
partment assess a large capital gain tax on assets delivered
to satisfy the marital deductions which was computed as a
dollar amount and the assets during that particular period
of administration had advanced to a considerable extent
over the date of death values used for the Federal Estate
Tax Return."
However, answers like these must be read against the statistic
of only 1.7 per cent having any difficulty whatsoever, as well as en-
couraging answers like that from still another bank which said:
"We did not have any difficulties in making the settle-
ment with the Federal authorities. In fact, the field agents
and the examiners have been very helpful and have seemed
to lean over backwards to help us settle any questions in
this regard. This has been true whether or not clauses de-
signed to make sure that a trust would qualify were in the
Will."
The next question asked was whether or not agents had gone
beyond their traditional interest in assets and deductions and had
concerned themselves with how the estate had been administered
and what had been used to satisfy the marital share. Only three of
the twenty-six banks, or 11.5 per cent of those responding, indicated
that this had ever occurred.
With regard to the deduction generally, the banks were asked
whether or not a series of protective clauses which were intended
to affirmatively safeguard the marital deduction were significant in
qualifying marital deduction gifts. Eight of the twenty-six banks
answered this question affirmatively. As to formula clauses them-
Expert * Commercial Printing
Brief Printers * Catalogues and Brochures
* Year Books- Magazines
e Books- Book Binding
TE O& en e House OrgansTHE ! 0t e
AM6 7 PRESS 2400 CURTIS STREET
AM 6-3277 eDenver, Colorado
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
selves, the banks were asked the number of cases in which such
clauses had caused actual administrative difficulty. Surprisingly,
such difficulties have apparently been caused in only fifteen of the
1956 estates, or about .8 per cent. Some of the banks commented
about the types of difficulties being encountered, pointing out that:
"We have had several instances in which the marital
deduction has caused some administrative difficulties, such
as in determining the matter of the income to which the
widow is entitled when her share is not determined until
late in the administration, and a question as to allocation of
assets; i.e., whether the marital trust must contain a frac-
tional interest in each and every asset. However, in each
case the matter has been worked out satisfactorily with all
parties concerned, and usually has been a matter of mathe-
matics more than anything else. We have been recom-
mending to attorneys that clauses be inserted to avoid these
difficulties, particularly with regard to how the marital gift
is satisfied so that, for instance, the trustees may satisfy
the marital trust in any manner deemed to the best in-
terests of the estate without the necessity of assigning
fractional interests so long as qualified assets are used."
And again:
"As a side light you might be interested in a situation
which we anticipate will come up from time to time, and
has already come up here, as to the effect on the marital
deduction when we select to use administration expenses
as a deduction for income tax purposes rather than federal
estate tax purposes, which I would say is almost always the
case where a marital deduction is involved because of the
low federal estate tax rate. A question has arisen as to
whether our election to so treat administration expenses
will increase, in effect, the value of the marital trust. In
the one case here where this has been of significance, the
matter was settled by agreement, and it was determined:
"(1) That the value of the marital trust would be de-
termined as though the deduction had been taken for fed-
eral estate tax purposes even though they were actually
taken as income tax deductions; and
"(2) That the income beneficiaries, including the wid-
ow, would have to reimburse corpus to the extent that the
federal estate tax was increased. Even with these adjust-
ments the election still proved very beneficial. I think also
there are cases along these lines, at least as to the reim-
bursement by the income beneficiaries."
The banks were next asked whether or not they preferred the
use of a "formula" marital deduction clause. Eighteen answered an
unqualified "yes," two a qualified "yes," one indicated no prefer-
ence, and four of the banks indicated that they did not prefer the
use of such a clause. They were next asked whether or not they
preferred a "pecuniary" clause or a "fraction of the residue" clause.
79.2 per cent of the banks prefer the fractional clause, while 20.8
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per cent prefer the pecuniary clause. One of them pointed out a
valuable practice in stating that:
"We have been reviewing Wills very carefully when
filed with us and have been insisting on necessary changes
so we have not had a serious situation involving incomplete
or defective qualification clauses."
In attempting to canvass the suggestions made by opponents of
formula clauses regarding efforts by surviving spouses to alter the
administration of the estate in a way which would favor them, the
banks were asked whether or not they had encountered situations
in which the surviving spouse had urged the election of the federal
optional valuation which would result in a larger federal estate tax
in order that her marital share would be bigger. Only one out of
the twenty-six indicated that this had ever occurred, and they point-
ed out that the consideration of it had been at their suggestion in a
single instance, and not at the surviving spouse's suggestion. That
bank pointed out that it was rejected after such consideration, and
that the bank felt that even if an attempt was made by itself along
these lines, that the other beneficiaries could probably raise serious
objection. They would recommend insertion of appropriate clauses
covering the situation.
The next question concerned the type of clause preferred re-
garding date of distribution value as against date of death value in
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satisfying a pecuniary gift. The banks were asked whether or not
they preferred one or the other of these and 41 per cent indicated
that they preferred a clause which would authorize distribution at
date of distribution values, while 59 per cent indicated a preference
for a clause authorizing distribution at date of death .or federal
estate tax values.
Finally, the banks were asked whether or not fewer problems
had developed regarding the marital deduction than anticipated.
Not all banks answered this question, but of those which did, only
9 per cent indicated that more questions had developed than they
had anticipated. Some of the comments here are equally interest-
ing in giving the point of view of institutions actually involved in
administering the marital deduction. For example, the following
are typical:
"We have encountered much less difficulty with regard
to the marital deduction than we anticipated. Perhaps this
is chiefly due to the interest and industry of our Bar Asso-
ciations and individual attorneys in finding out how to
properly draft marital deduction Wills. I might mention
that we have three men in our Estate Planning Division
who have been kept busy on Estate Planning work through-
out the state for a number of years. They do not ring any
doorbells and make no "cold calls" but work only on refer-
ences from attorneys, underwriters, C.P.A.'s, etc. Their first
objective is to get the prospect to an attorney, and we have
had wonderful cooperation from attorneys who were glad
to learn about trust administration, even though it might
be an entirely new field to them. The marital deduction
seems to have generated a tremendous and lasting 'em-
phasis on trust administration and probate practice in gen-
eral among the State Bar."
Again:
"Generally, the larger estates that we have handled
have been complicated by the marital deduction, and par-
ticularly Estate Planning, in the larger brackets, has de-
veloped severe problems. The particular area that has been
brought to our attention, due to the impact of the marital
deduction, involves those wishing to provide properly for
their families and their interests who are not compelled to
seek a tax solution rather than an economic and a personal
solution.
"In commenting, I feel the governmental function of
taxes for revenue purposes has been so distorted in the
estate tax field that it is no longer recognizable."
And finally:
"Generally we have had very few difficulties develop
in Federal audits. In this state the Federal agents are cur-
rently disallowing the spouse's award as a qualifying mari-
tal deduction. There are several cases pending in the
courts and we will probably have a decision fairly soon.
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Meanwhile there exists some uncertainty as to the proper
payment to be made under a formula type of legacy. Life
insurance and modes of settlement have proved trouble-
some in connection with some Federal audits.
"The primary problems that have arisen to date are in
the administration rather than in the tax field. The for-
mula type of will adds to the complexity of the administra-
tion and results in more paper work. The computations as
to income and principal and allocation of securities are
more involved. Other difficulties arise out of the use of
elective deductions during the probate period and the con-
sideration of possible adjustments between principal and
income. A longer period of administration is also an un-
desirable feature of formula marital deductions."
CONCLUSION
No economic step in a commercial society which can alter the
flow of hundreds of millions of dollars can be perfectly achieved
from its inception. The marvel of the marital deduction, which has
such a role, is that so few serious difficulties have developed. This
is at once a tribute to advisors and administrators, and a source of
confidence in the basic workability of the "new system" of taxa-
tion. If all tax changes of equal impact were as well conceived, in-
terpreted and administered, we should be a nation of more com-
fortable taxpayers, if such an anomaly can exist!
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